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Abstract—In this paper, we propose new image forgery detec-
tion and localization algorithms by recasting these problems as
graph-based community detection problems. We define localized
image tampering as any locally applied manipulation, including
splicing and airbrushing, but not globally applied processes such
as compression, whole-image resizing or contrast enhancement,
etc. To show this, we propose an abstract, graph-based represen-
tation of an image, which we call the Forensic Similarity Graph.
In this representation, small image patches are represented by
graph vertices, and edges that connect pairs of vertices are
assigned according to the forensic similarity between patches.
Localized tampering introduces unique structure into this graph,
which align with a concept called “communities” in graph-theory
literature. A community is a subset of vertices that contain
densely connected edges within the community, and relatively
sparse edges to other communities. In the Forensic Similarity
Graph, communities correspond to the tampered and unaltered
regions in the image. As a result, forgery detection is performed
by identifying whether multiple communities exist, and forgery
localization is performed by partitioning these communities. In
this paper, we additionally propose two community detection
techniques, adapted from literature, to detect and localize image
forgeries. We experimentally show that our proposed community
detection methods outperform existing state-of-the-art forgery
detection and localization methods.
Index Terms—Multimedia Forensics, Forgery Detection, Deep
Learning, Community Detection
I. INTRODUCTION
DETERMINING the authenticity of digital multimedia isan important social problem. Many important institutions
rely upon truthful multimedia content, including news services,
law firms, and intelligence agencies. As a result, multimedia
forensics researchers have developed a variety of approaches
to inspect images for evidence of forgery [1]. Many of these
approaches operate by directly identifying traces of manipula-
tion, such as resampling [2], double JPEG compression [3]–
[5], or contrast enhancement [6]. Other approaches have found
significant success by identifying inconsistencies in imaging
traces such as lens aberrations [7], [8], sensor noise [9], [10]
and general residual-based features [11], [12]. More recently,
deep learning based approaches have been found to be very ef-
fective for detecting and localizing image forgeries [13]–[20].
A recent deep-learning-based forensics approach called
“Forensic Similarity” has been shown to be a promising tech-
nique for forgery detection and localization [19], [20]. Earlier
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work in [19] demonstrated utility in forgery localization, and
later work [20] proposed a technique using Forensic Similarity
that outperformed prior art in forgery detection. Forensic
Similarity is a technique that maps two small image patches
to a score indicating whether the two patches contain the same
or different forensic traces. These forensic traces are related
to the source camera model and/or processing history of the
image. Importantly, Forensic Similarity is effective even on
“unknown” forensic traces that were not used to train the
system. By identifying differences in forensic traces within
an image, falsified images are exposed [19], [20].
While Forensic Similarity has shown encouraging promise
for forgery analysis, existing methods have several draw-
backs. First, previously proposed forgery localization tech-
niques based on Forensic Similarity require the selection of a
reference patch in a region known to be unaltered. This type of
approach is sensitive to the selection of reference patch, and is
an unrealistic scenario for a forensic investigator, who may not
know a priori which regions are unaltered. Second, the forgery
detection approach using Forensic Similarity in [20] uses
a heuristic detection measure. While the heuristic approach
achieved high forgery detection rates, performance can be sig-
nificantly improved by developing more powerful approaches.
To address these problems, in this work we build off of prior
Forensic Similarity research to more accurately detect image
forgeries and localize the falsified image regions. To do this,
we propose a new multimedia forensics concept called the
Forensic Similarity Graph, which is an abstract graph-based
representation of an image that captures important forensics re-
lationships among all image regions. Briefly, to do this we first
sample small patches from an image and represent each patch
as vertex of a graph. Then, we assign edge weights between
vertices according to the forensic similarity value between
each corresponding pair of patches. Localized image tamper-
ing (e.g. splicing or localized airbrushing) introduces partic-
ular structures, called communities, into this Forensic Graph
Representation. We propose two techniques to identify and
partition these communities, adapting community detection
techniques from literature [21]. Using our proposed technique
we expose localized image tampering with high accuracy, and
do so without requiring a reference patches to be selected.
The remaining sections of this paper are organized as
follows. In Sec. II, we discuss related works on forgery detec-
tion and localization, as well as related community detection
literature. In Sec. III we first introduce the concept of the
Forensic Similarity Graph, and describe how to compute it
in an image. In this section we also show how localized
tampering introduces identifiable structures, called “commu-
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2nities,” into the Forensic Similarity Graph. In Sec. IV, we
propose two community detection techniques which are used
to identify and partition these community structures. We show
how these techniques are used to detect forged images and, in
tampered images, localize the tampered regions. Furthermore,
we describe how the community partitions can be converted
to pixel-level forgery localization decisions. Finally, in Sec. V
and Sec. VI, we conduct a series of experiments testing the
efficacy of our proposed approach. Experiments show that
our proposed approach outperforms naive approaches that do
not consider community structure, improving upon heuristics
proposed in prior art. We also show that our approach outper-
forms prior-art localization approaches on publicly available
benchmark databases.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Image Forgery Detection and Localization
Multimedia forensics techniques explicitly draw the dis-
tinction between forgery detection and forgery localization.
Forgery detection methods are those that determine if an
image has been tampered or is alternatively unaltered. Forgery
localization methods are those that, given a forged image,
determine which regions of an image have been tampered.
While these are distinctly different problems, the underlying
mechanisms for analysis are similar and, as a result, are often
studied in conjunction. In this paper, we propose techniques
for both forgery detection and forgery localization.
Recently, researchers have leveraged advances in deep learn-
ing to perform both forgery detection and forgery localiza-
tion with high accuracy. In early work by Bondi et al. a
convolutional neural network (CNN) was used to generate
deep-feature representations of an image’s source camera-
model, and then detected and localized image forgeries via
an iterative k-means clustering approach [13]. Subsequently,
our work in [19] showed that the similarity of camera-model
related forensic traces can be directly measured using a CNN-
based siamese network, which can be used to localize image
forgeries. This idea was further refined by our research in [20],
where we proposed a more formal definition of Forensic Simi-
larity, which is the quantifiable measure of similarity of foren-
sic traces related to the source and/or processing between two
images patches, and refined the siamese network technique.
Deep learning forensics research by Cozzolino et al. [17],
[18] proposed a CNN that transforms an image to
highlight artifacts associated with camera-specific traces.
Inconsistencies in the resulting fingerprint map were then
used to identify forged regions. Huh et al. developed a
deep-learning technique to create a “consistency map” for
forged images [14]. In this consistency map approach, regions
of the image are highlighted which contain predictions of
EXIF-based metadata that are inconsistent with the majority
of the image. Huh et al. showed that taking spatial average
of the consistency map and comparing to a threshold can be
used to perform forgery detection.
The work in this paper directly builds from our prior
research on Forensic Similarity in [20]. In our prior work, we
showed that tampered regions of an image can be localized
by selecting reference patch, and highlighting the patches in
the image that contain different forensic traces. Provided a
patch in the unaltered region of the image was selected, the
tampered regions are highlighted. Furthermore, we showed
state-of-the-art forgery detection accuracy by computing the
forensic similarity values between all patches, computing the
mean of these values, and comparing that mean to a threshold.
In unaltered images, this value would be high indicating all
patches were forensically similar. Alternatively in tampered
images, this value would be low indicating some patches were
forensically dissimilar.
There are, however, drawbacks to existing forgery detection
and localization approaches using Forensic Similarity. First,
the forgery localization approach require a selection of a
reference patch in the image. This is problematic since the
investigator may not have knowledge of which regions of
the image are unaltered, and the poor selection of a patch
may lead to erroneous results. Second, the forgery detection
approach, which utilizes the mean forensic similarity value of
the image, does not adequately consider the complex forensic
relationships that occur in a tampered image. For example, a
large tampered region will be self-similar within the region, but
dissimilar to the unaltered part of the image. This type of rela-
tionship is lost by averaging all similarity values. Furthermore,
by utilizing the mean similarity value, the detection statistic
becomes inherently tied to the size of the forged region.
However, it is important to detect small forgeries with high
accuracy. This problem also occurs in the forgery detection
approach by Huh et al. [14], which utilizes the spatial average
of their EXIF consistency map to detect forgeries.
In this paper, we propose techniques that address these
drawbacks. To do this, we build a graph-based representation
of the image, called the Forensic Graph Representation. This
representation uses a graph to capture the forensic relation-
ships among all patches of the image. In images that have
been locally tampered, the tampered regions form communities
in this graph. As a result, the graph can be analyzed for
the existence of multiple communities, indicating tampering,
and those communities can be partitioned to localize the
tampered regions. By taking this approach, the proposed
methods leverage the complex relationships captured by the
graph representation to more accurately detect forgeries and
localize tampered regions without, addressing the drawbacks
of the existing Forensic Similarity approaches in [19] and [20].
B. Community Detection in Graphs
A graph is a set of elements, with each element called a
“vertex,” with “edges” that connect pairs of vertices. In this
work, we propose a graph-based representation of images,
with small image patches represented by vertices and edges
assigned according to the similarity of their forensic traces.
Communities are subsets of vertices with dense edges within
their own community [21]. In Sec. III, we will show how to
detect and localize forgeries by partitioning structures, called
communities, in this graph representation.
To partition communities in general graphs, researchers have
developed a number of techniques called “community detec-
tion” algorithms [21]. In this paper, we will directly build from
3two popular and successful techniques, namely Modularity
Optimization [22] and Spectral Clustering [23]. Modularity is
a quality index of how well a graph is partitioned into commu-
nities [21]. Modularity Optmization is a family of techniques
that find high quality partitions of graphs by optimizing for
Modularity. A second technique we build off of is Spectral
Clustering [23]. Spectral Clustering defines a matrix, called
the graph Laplacian, whose eigenvector spectrum has unique
properties. In particular, the eigenvalues of the graph Laplacian
contains clues about the number of communities that exist,
and the component values of the eigenvectors can be used
to accurately partition the graph in communities [23]. Further
details of each of these algorithms are described in Sec. IV.
III. THE FORENSIC SIMILARITY GRAPH
In this paper, we propose a new graph-based concept called
the “Forensic Similarity Graph” of an image. The Forensic
Similarity Graph captures important relationships among small
regions of an image. These relationships bear evidence of
localized tampering (e.g. splicing). Through analysis of this
representation, we detect and localize falsified images. In later
sections, we experimentally show that by using this proposed
technique, we detect forgeries with higher accuracy than with
techniques that do not capture such relationships.
In the Forensic Similarity Graph, each image patch is
represented by a vertex. Edges are assigned between each pair
of vertices with weight specified by the forensic similarity
between those two corresponding image patches. In forged
images, tampered regions form communities, where edges
within the tampered region are densely connected with high
weight, and are disconnected (or at least have low weight)
to the regions outside of the tampered region. The term
“community” aligns with literature on graph-based community
detection [21], [22], [26], which are used to analyze commu-
nity structures in other domains, such as social networks [27]
and biological networks [28].
The procedure we propose is as follows:
1) Sample n patches from the image
2) Calculate forensic similarity between all pairs of sam-
pled patches, according to [20]
3) Convert the image into its graph representation, with
patches as vertices and edges assigned according to the
forensic similarity between patches
4) Perform forgery detection and/or localization by
analyzing community structure in the Forensic
Similarity Graph
Here, we more formally describe the construction of the
Forensic Similarity Graph. To construct the Forensic Graph
of an image, we first sample n patches from the image
{X1, X2, . . . , Xn}, where Xi ∈ X is the ith sampled patch
and X is the space of image patches. In this paper we
use square patches that are regularly spaced and overlapped,
typically we use a patch sizes of 128× 128 or 256× 256 and
50% to 75% overlap in both x and y directions. However, we
note the proposed technique is general to irregularly shaped
patches and arbitrary sampling locations, provided a reliable
similarity measurement can be made.
(a) Original Image (b) Edited Image, with
Patch Indices Overlaid
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(c) Forensic Similarity Matrix
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
2728
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
4546
47
48
(d) Forensic Similarity Graph with Community Partitions
Fig. 1: An example of community structure in the forensic
similarity graph representation of a forged image. Original
image (a) and edited image (b), where water stains were
removed using a brush tool, with vertex indices overlaid.
Editing credit to Reddit.com user “/u/rombouts.” The forensic
similarity matrix in (c) shows the forensic similarity between
each sampled image patch. The graph representation in (d)
highlights the community structure, showing the patches as-
sociated with the tampered region appears as its own in-
connected cluster. The graph in (d) is drawn in igraph [24],
showing only edges > 0.90 and using the Kamada-Kawai
force-directed layout method [25].
4We define the graph G = (V,E) with vertex set
V = {X1, . . . , Xn}. and edges E which connect each unique
pairing of vertices. Edges have weight Wi,j equal to the foren-
sic similarity between Xi and Xj , given that the similarity is
larger than a threshold, and otherwise have weight 0. That is,
the graph has edge weights
Wi,j =
{
S (Xi, Xj) , S (Xi, Xj) ≥ t
0, S (Xi, Xj) < t
(1)
where Wi,j is the edge weight between vertex i and vertex
j, and S (Xi, Xj) ∈ [0, 1] is the forensic similarity between
image patch Xi and image patch Xj . Unless otherwise speci-
fied, we use a threshold t = 0 meaning that the graph is fully
connected, with n
2−n
2 non-zero edges. In some cases, we use
a threshold 1 > t > 0 to improve the visual interpretation
of the graph, or to improve algorithm performance. Here,
we use forensic similarity S(·, ·) as defined in [20], which
quantifies the similarity of the forensic traces across two image
patches related to the source and/or processing history. A
value of 1 indicates high similarity, and a value of 0 indicates
dissimilarity. The edge weights create the edge weight matrix,
which we refer to as the Forensic Similarity Matrix. In some
literature, an edge weight matrix is sometimes referred to as
the weighted adjacency matrix [21], [23].
Community structures in this Forensic Similarity Graph
are then used to identify and localize image forgeries. For
example, in an image that has been locally tampered (e.g.
a spliced image), an edge between a patch in the tampered
region and a patch in the unaltered image region will have
no-or-low weight, since they have dissimilar forensic traces.
However, edges among patches within a tampered region
are densely connected with high weight, provided that the
entirety of the tampered region contain the same forensic
traces, i.e. undergone the same tampering process (e.g. brush
tool, resizing, etc). Additionally, edges among patches in the
unaltered part of the image are similarly densely connected
with high weight, since all unaltered patches have the same
processing history. As a result, this forms subsets of vertices
have have high edge-connectivity within the subset, called a
community, and low edge-connectivity to other subsets.
In unaltered images, where every patch was captured by
the same camera model and has the same processing history,
all edges in the graph are expected to have high weight
forming only a single community. In addition, images that
have been uniformly/globally tampered will also have all
edges of high weight, since all patches will have the same
processing history. Examples of uniform tampering include
global image resizing, JPEG re-compression, and global non-
adaptive contrast enhancement.
Detecting community structures in general graphs has been
studied in other domains [21], [22], [26], [28]. In Sec. III,
we adapt two community detection techniques from literature,
and apply them to the Forensic Similarity Graph to perform
forgery detection and localization. Later, in Sec. V and VI, we
experimentally show that our proposed community detection
based approaches achieve higher forgery detection accuracy
than approaches that do not consider community structure.
1) Example: As an example, in Fig. 1 we show (b) a
tampered image, and (a) the corresponding original image.
In this tampered image, the person’s shirt has been edited
using a brush tool to remove the appearance of rain drops on
their shirt. The edited image was downloaded from the social
media website www.reddit.com, with editing credited to user
“/u/rombouts.”
The tampered image is sampled by gridding it into 256 ×
256 patches, with 50% overlap. An index is assigned to each
vertex and are shown in Fig. 1(b) at their corresponding patch
locations. The edge weight matrix is shown in Fig. 1(c), where
the vertices corresponding to the edited shirt patches, indices =
{14, 15, 16, 21, 22, 23, 28, 29}, have low similarity to the rest
of the image patches, and high similarity to other edited shirt
patches. Similarly, the non-edited patches have low similarity
to the edited patches, and high similarity to other non-edited
patches. This suggests that in this tampered image example,
there are two forensic “communities.”
In Fig. 1(d), the vertex-edge representation of this graph
is shown. For visualization purposes, we only draw edges
between vertices that have forensic similarity > 0.90. This
visual representation clearly highlights that two communities
exist, one associated with the tampered region, and one associ-
ated with the non-tampered region. Vertex colors are assigned
according to the partitioning determined by the a “modularity
optimization” method [26], with edges between communities
grayed out. The graph is arranged according to the Kamada-
Kawai force directed algorithm [25]. Layout and partitioning
were performed using the igraph software package [24].
IV. COMMUNITY DETECTION
In the previous section, we introduced the Forensic Sim-
ilarity Graph of an image and provided intuition about how
structures in this representation, called “communities,” indicate
that the image has been locally tampered. In this section, we
introduce techniques to detect and analyze this community
structure in graphs in order to accurately detect forgeries and
localize those tampered regions.
Forgery detection and forgery localization are two related,
but very different problems in multimedia forensics, and are
differentiated in literature [13], [14]. Forgery detection tech-
niques are used to indicate whether tampering has occurred
in the image, and output a binary yes/no decision about
the image. In this work, we propose community detection
techniques that input a forensic graph and output a forgery
detection decision,
Forgery Detection(G)→{Image is Unaltered, (2)
Image is Forged} , (3)
We also propose community detection techniques that input a
forensic graph, and output a tampering classification for each
patch of the image, which is then used to segment the tampered
regions of the image,
Forgery Localization(G)→ {c1, c2, . . . , cn} , (4)
where ci ∈ {1, . . . , k} is the community membership for the
ith vertex in the graph, i.e. sampled image patch, and n is the
5number of sampled image patches. We note that the nature of
this type of localization analysis partitions the tampered region
from the unaltered, but does not inherently identify which of
the partitioned regions is the tampered one or unaltered one.
This is why each vertex/patch is mapped into a community
identifier {1, . . . , k} as opposed to {Unaltered,Forged}. In
this paper we focus on the case of k = 2, since most
evaluation databases only differentiate between the tampered
and unaltered regions, and don’t differentiate between different
tampered regions, if they exist. However, the techniques we
propose are general to k > 2. Recent work has highlighted
the need for techniques that identify more than one tampered
region [29].
In the remainder of this section, we introduce two com-
munity detection techniques from literature, namely Spectral
Clustering and Modularity Optimization, and adapt them to the
problems of image forgery detection and localization. While
there exists many different community structure analysis tech-
niques, spectral clustering and and modularity optimization are
two of the most popular and successful techniques [21].
Additionally, we show how to convert the patch-based
localization partitions, which result from the community de-
tection methods, into a pixel-level segmentation of forged
and unaltered regions. This is done so that the proposed
localization methods can be effectively compared to other
forgery localization techniques that operate at the pixel-level,
such as those in [11], [13], [14].
A. Spectral Clustering
In this method, we apply a technique called Spectral Clus-
tering to the forensic similarity graph to detect forgeries
and/or localize tampered regions. Spectral clustering is a
technique for partitioning graphs into clusters [21], [23], [30],
which leverages properties of the graph Laplacian matrix to
determine community structures.
The graph Laplacian matrix, L, is defined as
L = D −W, (5)
where W is the edge weight matrix with elements
Wi,j = S(Xi, Xj) equal to the forensic similarity between
image patches Xi and Xj , and D is the degree matrix with
values
Dii =
∑
j
Wij (6)
on the diagonal, and zeroes off-diagonal. Additionally, we
define the normalized graph Laplacian
Lnorm = D
− 12LD−
1
2 , (7)
which regularizes the matrix.
The graph Laplacian has a number of special properties.
In particular, it has spectrum of non-negative real valued
eigenvalues 0 = λ1 ≤ λ2 ≤ . . . ≤ λn. These eigenvalues
a have property such that the multiplicity of λ = 0 is equal
to the number of disconnected communities in the graph.
Furthermore, the eigenspace of 0 is spanned by the indicator
vectors 1A1 , ...,1Ak of those k communities, where Ai is the
vertex membership of the ith community. For the normalized
λ2 = 318.42
Qopt = 0.0030
(a) Original
λ2 = 76.75
Qopt = 0.0438
(b) Edited
λ2 = 235.56
Qopt = 0.0149
(c) Original
λ2 = 4.28
Qopt = 0.0685
(d) Edited
Fig. 2: Forgery detection scores on example original and
manipulated images. Low λ2 values (< 100) and high Qopt
values (> 0.025) indicate localized tampering.
graph Laplacian, it this eigenspace spanned by D
1
21A1 [23],
[30]. We use these properties for detecting forgeries and
localizing the forged regions, described further in detail below.
1) Forgery Detection: Here we use the fact that the mul-
tiplicity of λ = 0 is equal to the number of disconnected
communities in the graph to decide whether an image has
been forged. Typically, this multiplicity is used to determine
the number of communities in graph by determining the
number of consecutive eigenvalues less than a threshold, and
is sometimes called the “Eigengap” heuristic [23]. However,
the problem of forgery detection is different in that we need
to know only whether the image is forged or unaltered.
In other words, we are concerned only if there exists a
single community (unaltered) or, alternatively, more than one
community (localized tampered).
To do this, in our approach we calculate the second smallest
eigenvalue λ2. If this value is low, it is indication that at least
two communities exist, and potentially more. If it is high, then
it is an indication only one community exists, and the image
has not been altered. As a result, our forgery detection decision
rule becomes
Spectral Gap (G) =
{
Unaltered, λ2 ≥ τ
Forged, λ2 < τ,
(8)
where G is the forensic similarity graph of the image, λ2
is second smallest eigenvalue of the graph Laplacian from
Eq. (5), and τ is the decision threshold determined empirically
depending on the desired operating point.
Examples of the spectral gap are shown in Fig. 2 for
unaltered and forged images. In the two unaltered images(a)
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Fig. 3: Component values of u2 for the edited image in
Fig. 2(d). In this example, components of u2 corresponding
to the forged patches are greater than 0, and unaltered patches
are less than 0.
and (c) the spectral gap values of 318.42 and 235.56 are
high, indicating that only one forensic community exists and
no tampering has occurred. In the two spliced images (b)
and (d) the spectral gap values of 76.75 and 4.28 are low,
indicating that more than one forensic community exists and
the tampering has occurred.
2) Forgery Localization: To perform localization, we use
the fact that the eigenspace of 0 of the graph Laplacian is
spanned by the indicator vectors 1Ai to partition the graph
vertices into forged and unaltered regions. In this paper we
consider the case of k = 2, in order to partition the tampered
versus unaltered regions. To do this, we first calculate the
eigenvector u2 ∈ Rn associated with the eigenvector λ2
Lu2 = λ2u2, (9)
where λ2 is the second smallest eigenvalue of the graph
Laplacian matrix.
Next, we use the sign of each component of u2 to assign
each vertex into a community membership,
cˆi =
{
1, ui,2 ≥ 0
2, ui,2 < 0,
(10)
where cˆi is the predicted community membership of the ith
graph vertex / image patch. This method approximates the
(NP-Hard) Ratio cut algorithm for k = 2. When using the
normalized graph Laplacian, it approximates the Normalized
Cut algorithm [23].
An example of this algorithm is shown in Fig. 3, where we
partition the image patches from the spliced image in Fig. 2(d)
into two communities. In this figure, we show the histogram of
values of u2. The components associated with patches in the
tampered region are shown in blue, and are typically above
0. The components associated with patches in the unaltered
regions are shown in orange, and are typically below 0. Ground
truth was determined based on the central location of each
image patch.
We note that this algorithm can be easily extended to
consider k > 2. This is done by considering the eigenvector
values for each vertex as a point in space and performing k-
means clustering [23].
B. Modularity Optimization
Here, we apply a 2nd community detection technique for
forgery detection and localization. In this method, we use
a technique called Modularity Optimization to the Forensic
Similarity Graph to detect and localize forgeries. Modularity,
Q, i an index for the quality of how well a graph has been
partitioned into communities [21], defined as:
Q =
1
4m
∑
i,j
(
Wij − didj
2m
)
1(ci = cj) (11)
where m is the sum of edges in the graph, W is the edge
weight matrix, di is the weighted degree of node i, and the
indicator function 1(ci = cj) is 1 when both node i and j are
assigned to be members of the the same community. The term
didj
2m is related to the expected weight of a randomly occurring
connection between vertices i and j. Intuitively, if two vertices
in the same community have a low connection expectation,
but have a high weight between them, then modularity is
increased.
Modularity Optimization is a family of techniques used to
determine the underlying community memberships in a graph.
These techniques operate by assign vertices to communities
such that modularity is maximized,
Qopt = max{c1,...,cn}
1
4m
∑
i,j
(
Wij − didj
2m
)
1(ci = cj). (12)
Higher values of modularity indicate that community structure
exists, and that a good partitioning has been found [21], [22],
[26]. Modularity in the case of a single community is zero.
To calculate, Qopt we use a popular modularity opti-
mization technique called the “fast-greedy” method, which
agglomeratively forms communities by iteratively combining
communities which yield the greatest modularity increase [31],
[32], and reports the largest modularity value found. While
there are a number of variations of modularity optimization
techniques, the fast-greedy method is a popular technique [21]
and operates on a reasonable timescale on our forensic graphs.
Furthermore, we typically use a thresholded edge weight
matrix (1), often with a threshold 0.5 < t < 0.9, for
modularity optimization techniques. Using a thresholded edge
weight matrix significantly reduces the complexity of the
optimization, and we have anecdotally found that doing so
produces more reliable modularity scores.
1) Forgery Detection: To detect whether the image has
been locally tampered, we compare the optimized modularity
value, Qopt, found for the optimal partition to a threshold.
If Qopt exceeds the threshold, it indicates that there is strong
community structure and, as a result, indicates that one or more
regions of the image has been tampered with. Our decision
measure becomes
Modularity Opt (G) =
{
Unaltered, Qopt < τ
Forged, Qopt ≥ τ,
(13)
where G is the forensic similarity graph of the image, Qopt
is the optimized modularity value found on G, and τ is the
decision threshold, chosen empirically.
72) Forgery Localization: Here, we localize tampered re-
gions by using the optimized community memberships, cˆ, to
assign each patch into a community,
{cˆ1, . . . , cˆn} = argmax
{c1,...,cn}
1
4m
∑
i,j
(
Wij − didj
2m
)
1(ci = cj)
(14)
where cˆi ∈ {1, . . . , k} is the optimized community member-
ship of the ith vertex/image patch determined by the modu-
larity optimization algorithm. As with the Spectral Clustering
method, we use k = 2 to segment the unaltered region from the
forged region(s). Though we note that this method is trivially
extendable to k > 2.
As an example, the partitioning into the green and
red coloring of Fig. 1 was determined by the Modularity
Optimization method, using an edge weighting threshold of
t = 0.9 and k = 2.
C. Pixel-level localization
The above localization techniques partition image patches
into forged and unaltered regions. However, localization is
often performed at the pixel level [11], [13], [14]. Here, we
describe how to convert patch-level community partitions to a
pixel-level forgery localization.
We start by building a pixel map of localization predictions
P with dimensions in x and y that are the same as the image,
Px,y =
N∑
l=1
1 [cl = α]1 [(x, y) ∈ Rl] , (15)
where cl is the predicted community membership for patch
l, and Rl is the set of coordinates covered by patch l.
That is, for each pixel we sum the number of patches that
contain that pixel and are also predicted to be in community
α ∈ {1, . . . , k}. The investigator can vary α to inspect the
various communities. For k = 2, we choose α to be the smaller
of the two communities, since the largest community is likely
to be the unaltered region.
Pixels near the edges and corners of an image are covered
by less patches, and are more difficult to accurately predict.
To address this, we create a normalized pixel map
PNormx,y =
Px,y
Tx,y
, (16)
where T is the map of total patches that cover each pixel
defined by
Tx,y =
N∑
l=1
1 [(x, y) ∈ Rl] . (17)
Finally, we smooth the normalized pixel map, using a
Gaussian blur kernel, and compare to a threshold, chosen
empirically.
In Fig. 4, we show an example. Fig. 4a shows an edited
image from the Carvalho database [33] and Fig. 4b shows the
ground truth mask, with the edited region highlighted in black.
Fig. 4c shows the patch-level prediction map, determined using
the Spectral Clustering method. Since patches were sampled
from image with 50% overlap, pixels are covered by 1 to 4
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Fig. 4: An example showing the conversion from patch-
level community partitions to pixel-level forgery localization,
described in Sec. IV-C.
(a) Columbia [34] (b) Carvalho [33] (c) Korus [35]
Fig. 5: Example forgeries from the benchmark datasets.
patches, as shown in Fig. 4d. Fig. 4e shows the normalized
prediction map, in which we can see more confident forgery
localization along the corner and edges of the image. Finally,
Fig. 4f shows the smoothed and thresholded version of the
normalized prediction map, in which the tampered region is
localized and matches the ground truth.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS: FORGERY DETECTION
We conducted a series of experiments to test the efficacy of
our proposed approach for forgery detection and localization.
In this section, we describe the experimental procedures and
results for forgery detection. In Sec. VI, we conduct exper-
iments to test forgery localization performance. In general,
we found that the proposed Spectral Gap technique achieved
highest forgery detection performance, and outperformed naive
methods that do not include community structure.
We performed two sets of experiments for forgery detec-
tion. In the first experiment, we evaluated performance on
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Fig. 6: Forgery detection ROC curves on benchmark datasets
three publicly available benchmark datasets, which contain
unaltered and tampered images. In the second experiment,
we evaluated performance on “synthetic” forgeries, which
were created by copying and pasting a block from one image
into another. While not realistic in appearance, the synthetic
forgery experiment shows statistical characterizations of the
system, controlling for the size of the forged area.
In these experiments we compared our proposed community
detection techniques to several approaches. First, we compare
to two naive approaches that utilize the same forensic similar-
ity procedure of our proposed approach but do not consider
community structure. These are 1) “Mean Similarity” which
is the average forensic similarity edge weight as a detection
measure and used in prior work [20], and 2) “Minimum
Similarity” using the minimum forensic similarity edge weight
as a detection measure. A significant contribution of the Foren-
sic Similarity Graph is that it captures complex relationships
among regions of the image, in the form of communities,
which enables more powerful analysis. The following exper-
iments show that the proposed community detection based
approaches outperform these naive approaches. These results
highlight that identifying community structure is critical to
accurately detecting image forgeries.
In addition, we compared against several state-of-the-art
methods. We compared against the work by Huh et al. [14],
which computes a deep-learning based self-consistency map
and detects image forgeries by spatially averaging this map,
and comparing to a threshold. They compute three types of
self-consistency maps based on camera-model consistency,
image consistency, or EXIF consistency. Our approach is most
comparable to the “Camera” approach in [14], since forensic
similarity network we used was trained on patches labeled
according to their source camera model. We also compared to
the work by Bondi et al. [13], in which an 18-elements feature
vector is extracted with a CNN trained for camera model
identification on 64 x 64 pixels patches. A simple clustering
TABLE I: AP on Benchmarking Databases
Columbia Carvalho Korus
Bondi et al. [13] 0.70 0.76 0.53
Huh ”Camera” [14] 0.70 0.73 0.15
Huh ”Image” [14] 0.97 0.75 0.58
Huh ”EXIF” [14] 0.98 0.87 0.55
Patch Size
Spectral Gap 128 0.95 0.95 0.65
256 0.94 0.97 0.59
Modularity Opt. 128 0.95 0.90 0.60
256 0.92 0.95 0.57
Min. Sim. 128 0.94 0.92 0.65
256 0.89 0.96 0.59
Mean Sim. 128 0.95 0.91 0.60
256 0.92 0.95 0.57
TABLE II: PD at PFA = 0.01 on Benchmarking Databases
Columbia Carvalho Korus
Bondi et al. [13] 0.07 0.03 0.01
Huh ”EXIF” [14] 0.51 0.17 0.01
Patch Size
Spectral Gap 128 0.56 0.43 0.16
256 0.60 0.80 0.05
Modularity Opt. 128 0.46 0.41 0.02
256 0.64 0.38 0.03
Min. Sim. 128 0.39 0.49 0.11
256 0.36 0.75 0.07
Mean Sim. 128 0.23 0.46 0.01
256 0.45 0.51 0.01
procedure is iteratively applied to separate the background
from the foreground.
In these experiments, we calculated the forensic similarity
of image patches using the deep-learning approach described
in [20], trained on four million image patches from 80 camera
models. Two networks were tested, one with forensic patch
size 128×128, and a second with size 256×256. Patches were
sampled spanning the image with 50% overlap. The forensic
similarity graph was constructed for each testing image as
described in Sec. III. Finally a forgery decision was rendered
based on the proposed detection methods in Sec. IV.
A. Performance on Benchmark Datasets
In this experiment, we evaluated the performance of
our approach on publicly-available benchmarking datasets.
These databases are 1) the “Columbia Uncompressed Splicing
Database” [34] containing 180 spliced and 183 authentic tiff
images ranging from sizes 757 × 568 to 1152 × 768, 2) the
“Carvalho DSO-1 Database” [33] containing 100 spliced and
100 authentic png images of size 2048 × 1536, and 3) the
“Korus Realistic Tampering Dataset” [35] containing 220
tampered and 220 corresponding original tiff images of size
1920× 1080. Examples of spliced images from each database
are shown in Fig.5.
Fig. 6 shows receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves
for our proposed approaches, as well as the methods we
compare against. The ROC curve shows the trade off of the
probability of correct detection (PD) of a forged image versus
the probability of false alarm (PFA), i.e. misclassification, of
an unaltered image. In the majority of cases, our proposed
approaches achieved highest performance, with the Spectral
Gap method achieving highest detection rates. We note that
the Huh et al. EXIF method achieves higher detection rates
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Fig. 7: Synthetic forgery detection results. The plot (a) shows ROC curves for proposed and naive methods in synthetic
forgeries with forgery block size of 256×256. Plot (b) shows the forgery detection probability for each method for different
forgery block sizes. Plot (c) shows the ROC area-under-the-curve at challenging forgery block sizes using the spectral gap
method with two different forensic patch sizes. In (c) forgery block size is displayed as relative area to the forensic patch size.
at high false alarm rates in the Columbia dataset, but was
outperformed by our approaches at low false alarm rates. This
is important because in many realistic conditions, forensic
investigators must operate at low false alarm rates. This is
because scenarios such as criminal or intelligence investiga-
tions, there can be a high cost to misidentifying an unaltered
image as falsified.
Table I shows the mean-Average-Precision (mAP) scores
for our proposed approaches as well as the methods we
compared against. The mAP measure was chosen to compare
to the reported scores in [14]. All of our proposed approaches
achieved higher mAP scores than the exisitng Bondi et al.,
and Huh “Camera” approaches. The Huh “EXIF” method
achieved a higher mAP score of 0.98 in the Columbia dataset.
However, our proposed Spectral Gap method outperformed it
on the more challenging Carvalho and Korus datasets, with
mAP scores of 0.97 using a 256×256 forensic patch size on
Carvalho, and 0.65 using a 128×128 forensic patch size on
the Korus dataset.
Table II shows the detection rate (PD) at the low false alarm
rate of 0.01 for the tested approaches. Operating at low false
alarm rates are important for investigators, due to the high cost
of falsely identifying authentic content as tampered, and due to
the high volume of unaltered content that they encounter. For
the Columbia database, the Modularity Optimization approach
with a patch size 256 × 256 achieved highest detection rate
of 0.64. The Spectral Gap approach achieved highest rates of
0.80 on the Carvalho dataset with a size of 256 × 256, and
0.16 on the Korus dataset with a size of 128× 128.
Relative to the naive approaches, the Spectral Gap tends
to outperform both of the “Mean” and “Minimum” in terms
of mAP. These improvements are more noticeable in PD at
low PFA rates. This finding shows that detecting community
structure is important for detecting image forgeries, especially
at low false alarm rates.
The Modularity Optimization approach performed very well
on the Columbia database, achieving the highest PD of 0.64
at PFA = 0.01. However, performance degraded significantly
in the other databases. One possible reason behind this is
that modularity optimization techniques are known to have
difficulties detecting communities that are small relative to the
size of the graph [36]. The forged regions in Columbia dataset
are much larger relative to the size of the image than in the
Carvalho and Korus datasets.
The results of this experiment show that our proposed tech-
nique exceeds prior-art forgery detection performance on the
three tested benchmark datasets, and significantly outperforms
these approaches in challenging datasets. The experiment also
shows that significant benefit of using community-structure
aware approaches was achieved at low false alarm rates.
B. Characterizations on Synthetic Forgeries
In the above experiment, we observed that some forgeries
were more challenging to detect than others. In this experi-
ment, we studied the impact of the tampered region size on
forgery detection performance. To do this, we started with
a database of images from the VISION database [37], using
the “natural” images from the 35 cameras in the database.
This database was chosen since the camera models in the
database were different from those used to train our proposed
system, representing a more practical scenario. We then cre-
ated synthetic forgeries by copying a small-block from one
image into another at random locations. We refer to the size
of this block as the forgery block size. We tested detection
rates at different forgery block sizes, and for a given forgery
block size, we created 1000 such forgeries. To control for the
size of the image, we ensured that the host image was of
size 3264× 2448, the most common size in the dataset. For
unaltered images, we used 1000 images randomly chosen of
size 3264×2448. To ensure an appropriate similarity signal
was present, the donor and host images were captured by
different camera models. We then calculated the proposed
detection measures on each forged and authentic image to
evaluate performance.
Fig. 7 shows forgery detection performance for the two
community approaches and two naive approaches, using an
input patch size of 256×256. Fig. 7(a) shows ROC curves
for these approaches at the 256 × 256 forgery block size. In
this case, the Spectral Gap and Minimum Similarity methods
demonstrated improved performance over the Modularity Op-
timization and Mean Similarity approaches. Notably, the Spec-
tral Gap showed significant improvement over the community-
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Fig. 8: Localization examples from the benchmarking datasets. Localization is performed using comparison methods, and our
proposed Spectral Clustering method. Example images are from the (a) Columbia, (b-e) Carvalho, and (f-i) Korus datasets.
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naive Minimum Similarity method at low false alarm rates
between 0 and 0.10.
Fig. 7(b) shows the positive detection rates of the four
approaches at a false alarm rate of 0.05. In general, all
approaches performed poorly at the smallest forgery size of
128 × 128, corresponding to the size of the CNN input, and
improved with forgery block size. All approaches achieved
PD > 0.98 with the forgery block size of 1024× 1024. This
experiment demonstrates that forgery size has a significant
effect on detection performance. In particular, it impacted
the Modularity Optimization method. Modularity optimization
methods are well known to have difficulty in detecting commu-
nities much smaller than the size of the graph [36]. The largest
forgery block size of 1024×1024 is approximately 13% of the
image size, whereas 256 × 256 is less than 1% of the image
size. Further experimentation on the impact of forgery size rel-
ative to the image size may lend further insight on this finding.
We further experimented using the Spectral Gap method
at more challenging forgery block sizes. Fig. 7(c) shows the
ROC area-under-the-curve (AUC) of forgery block sizes from
50×50 to 250×250, for forensic patch sizes of 128×128 and
256×256. The Spectral Gap method achieved an AUC > 0.90
for forgery block sizes above 125× 125, when using an input
forensic patch size of 128×128, and achieved an AUC > 0.90
for forgery block sizes above 250× 250, when using an input
forensic patch size of 256 × 256. We normalized the x-axis
of the result relative to the forgery size, equal to the area of
the forgery size divided by the area of the analysis patch size.
We see that Spectral Gap performance steeply improves for
forgery sizes larger than the analysis patch size.
The results of this experiment highlight strong dependence
of the proposed approaches on the size of the tampered region.
The Spectral Gap method performed well when forgery sizes
were equal to or greater than the analysis patch size. At
challenging forgery sizes, the Spectral Gap method showed
performance improvements over the naive Minimum Simi-
larity approach, demonstrating the importance of identifying
community structures captured by the Forensic Similarity
Graph. The Modularity Optimization method worked well only
when the forgery size was large, demonstrating a dependence
on size of the tampered region relative to the size of whole
image for this approach.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS: FORGERY LOCALIZATION
In this set of experiments, we tested the efficacy of our
proposed forgery localization approaches. To do this, we
performed forgery localization on tampered images from the
three publicly available datasets used in the prior experi-
ments. We evaluated forgery localizations using a variety
of scoring measures, and compared to existing-art methods.
The methods we compare to include localization methods by
Bondi et al. [13] and Huh et al. [14], which were compared
against in the previous forgery detection experiments. In
addition, we compared to two localization-only techniques, the
rich-model based SpliceBuster [11] and deep-learning based
NoisePrint [18] methods by Cozzolino et al. The results of our
experiments shows that our proposed approaches outperform
these existing-art methods in the majority of scenarios.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Fig. 9: Spectral clustering localization examples on images
downloaded from the social media website Reddit.com. Image
editing credit to Reddit users “artunitinc” (a), “ene due rabe”
(b-c), and “Hordon Gayward” (d).
To construct the forensic similarity graph for each forged
image, we first sampled the image using patches of size
128× 128, with 75% overlap in each dimension. The smaller
patch size and higher overlap was chosen to increase spatial
resolution. Then, we calculated the forensic similarity between
image patches using the deep-learning approach described
in [20], trained on four million image patches from 80 camera
models. The forensic similarity graph was constructed for
each forged image as described in Sec. III. Then, forgery
localization was performed according to the proposed methods
in Sec. IV. For the Spectral Clustering methods, we tested
both cases with the non-normalized Laplacian, and the nor-
malized Laplacian. For the modularity optimization approach,
we used a edge threshold t = 0.7. Finally, the pixel-level
forgery prediction map was created according to the method in
Sec. IV-C using a Gaussian smoothing function with window
size of 32× 32.
Fig. 8 shows un-thresholded localization examples on tam-
pered images from the benchmark databases. From left to
right, we show the edited image, the ground truth mask, and
the localization results from the SpliceBuster algorithm [11],
the Huh et al. algorithm [14], the Noiseprint algorithm [18],
and our proposed Spectral Clustering algorithm. Row (a)
corresponds to an example tampered image from the Columbia
dataset, rows (b)-(e) correspond to tampered images from the
Carvalho dataset, and rows (f)-(i) correspond to tampered
images from the Korus dataset. These examples show the
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TABLE III: MCC, per image threshold
Columbia Carvalho Korus
Splice Buster [11] 0.68 0.56 0.34
Bondi et al. [13] 0.50 0.35 0.22
Huh et al. EXIF [14] 0.87 0.46 0.23
NoisePrint [18] 0.74 0.72 0.31
Modularity Opt. (t=0.7) 0.85 0.72 0.26
Spectral Clustering 0.86 0.80 0.38
Normed Spectral Clust. 0.84 0.77 0.25
TABLE IV: MCC, per database threshold
Columbia Carvalho Korus
Splice Buster [11] 0.63 0.53 0.28
Bondi et al. [13] 0.45 0.29 0.14
Huh et al. “EXIF” [14] 0.78 0.38 0.17
NoisePrint [18] 0.68 0.67 0.24
Modularity Opt. (t=0.7) 0.80 0.65 0.19
Spectral Clustering 0.82 0.75 0.31
Normed Spectral Clust. 0.79 0.70 0.20
power of our proposed approach. In many cases, our proposed
approach accurately localized the tampered region, even in
scenarios where the other algorithms had difficulty such as in
the Korus dataset.
In addition, in Fig. 9 we show localization results from
images downloaded from a photo-manipulating competition
forum on Reddit.com, a social media website. These images
contain highly varying and complex tampering techniques.
Still, our proposed Spectral Clustering localization algorithm
accurately localized the tampered regions of the images. These
examples show that our proposed technique is effective on
realistically tampered images, including those downloaded
from social media websites.
To quantify localization performance, we used several scor-
ing measures. Namely, we used Matthews Correlation Coeffi-
cient1 (MCC), the F1 score2, and the Area Under the Curve
(AUC) of the reciever operatoring characteristic curve (ROC).
The MCC and F1 scores require a choice of threshold, we
evaluated both cases where the threshold was chosen for each
image, according to the approach in [14], and where the
threshold was chosen for the entire database. Setting a single
threshold for the entire database is a more realistic scenario,
since the forensic investigator does not have ground truth data
available for each image under investigation and must choose a
threshold using outside information. The MCC and F1 scores
were calculated for each image and then averaged for each
benchmark database, the AUC score was calculated using the
ROC determined by all pixels in the database.
Table III shows MCC scores for our proposed and com-
parison approaches on the three benchmark datasets, using
per-image thresholds, meaning that a different threshold was
chosen for each image. For the Columbia dataset, our pro-
posed methods achieved high scores of 0.84 and above, with
the Spectral Clustering method performing the highest of
0.86 among the proposed methods, and just under the score
achieved by Huh et al. For the more challenging Carvalho
1MCC = TP×TN−FP×FN√
(TP+TP )(TP−FN)(TN+FP )(TN+FN)
2F1 = 2
precision×recall
precision+recall
TABLE V: F1, per image threshold
Columbia Carvalho Korus
Splice Buster [11] 0.78 0.62 0.36
Bondi et al. [13] 0.64 0.44 0.24
Huh et al. “EXIF” [14] 0.90 0.53 0.25
NoisePrint [18] 0.81 0.75 0.32
Modularity Opt. (t=0.7) 0.88 0.73 0.26
Spectral Clustering. 0.89 0.82 0.39
Normed Spectral Clust. 0.88 0.78 0.26
TABLE VI: F1, per database threshold
Columbia Carvalho Korus
Splice Buster [11] 0.74 0.59 0.30
Bondi et al. [13] 0.59 0.39 0.18
Huh et al. “EXIF” [14] 0.82 0.45 0.20
NoisePrint [18] 0.76 0.70 0.26
Modularity Opt. (t=0.7) 0.83 0.66 0.20
Spectral Clustering 0.86 0.77 0.32
Normed Spectral Clust. 0.83 0.70 0.20
dataset, all three of our proposed methods outperformed
the comparison methods. The Spectral Clustering algorithm
achieved an MCC score of 0.80, which is significantly higher
than the next highest comparison method. For the most
challenging Korus dataset, our proposed spectral clustering
achieved the highest MCC score of 0.38.
Table IV shows MCC scores using per-database thresholds,
meaning that a single threshold was used for each database
and is a more practical scenario. In all three benchmark
datasets, our proposed Spectral Clustering algorithm achieved
the highest scores. In the Columbia dataset, all three of
our proposed methods outperform the Huh et al. method,
suggesting that our proposed technique is more consistent and
does not require threshold tuning for each image.
Similar trends were found for the F1 scores, which are
shown with per-image thresholds in Table V and with per-
database thresholds in Table VI. The proposed Spectral Clus-
tering method achieved highest F1 scores in the scenario where
a single threshold was chosen for each database. For the per-
image scenario, Spectral Clustering method achieved highest
scores in the more challenging Carvalho and Korus datasets,
and nearly achieved the highest score of 0.90 by the Huh et
al. method.
Table VII shows the area under the curve (AUC) scores
for each method. In the Columbia dataset, both the Modular-
ity Optimization and Normalized Spectral Clustering method
achieved high AUC scores of 0.95. The highest score of 0.96
was achieved by the Huh et al. method. All three of the pro-
posed methods outperform all comparison methods in the more
TABLE VII: Area Under the Curve (AUC)
Columbia Carvalho Korus
Splice Buster [11] 0.79 0.68 0.56
Bondi et al. [13] 0.77 0.64 0.60
Huh et al. “EXIF” [14] 0.96 0.72 0.57
NoisePrint [18] 0.85 0.76 0.58
Modularity Opt. (t=0.7) 0.95 0.94 0.73
Spectral Clustering 0.93 0.89 0.60
Normed Spectral Clust. 0.95 0.97 0.72
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challenging Carvalho and Korus datasets. Notably, the Normed
Spectral Clustering method achieved a 0.97 AUC on the Car-
valho dataset, the next highest score by a comparison method
was 0.72. The Modularity Optimization method achieved a
AUC of 0.73 on the Korus dataset, and the next highest
score by a comparison method was 0.60. While the Spectral
Clustering method does not achieve the highest AUC in the
Carvalho and Korus datasets, it does outperform prior art.
The results of this experiment shows that our proposed
community detection techniques, and in particular the Spec-
tral Clustering method, consistently outperforms existing art
demonstrating the power of our proposed Forensic Similarity
Graph based approach. This was shown on several bench-
marking forgery databases with a variety of scoring measures.
These and the forgery detection experiments highlight the im-
portance of considering community structures when analyzing
image forgeries.
VII. CONCLUSION
We proposed an abstract, graph-based representation of an
image, which we call the Forensic Similarity Graph. This
representation can be used to analyze images for evidence
localized tampering with high accuracy. Small image patches
are represented by graph vertices with edges assigned
according to their forensic similarity. Tampered and unaltered
regions form unique structures that align with a concept called
“communities” in graph-theory literature. As a result, forgery
detection is performed by identifying multiple communities,
and forgery localization is performed by partitioning these
communities. We experimentally showed that this approach
signficantly outperforms naive implementations that do not
consider this community structure, including prior art.
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